#############################################################################
#  ipsec.py --- IPsec support for Scapy                                     #
#                                                                           #
#  Copyright (C) 2014  6WIND                                                #
#                                                                           #
#  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it  #
#  under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as           #
#  published by the Free Software Foundation.                               #
#                                                                           #
#  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but      #
#  WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of               #
#  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU        #
#  General Public License for more details.                                 #
#############################################################################
r"""
IPsec layer
===========

Example of use:

>>> sa = SecurityAssociation(ESP, spi=0xdeadbeef, crypt_algo='AES-CBC',
...                          crypt_key='sixteenbytes key')
>>> p = IP(src='1.1.1.1', dst='2.2.2.2')
>>> p /= TCP(sport=45012, dport=80)
>>> p /= Raw('testdata')
>>> p = IP(raw(p))
>>> p
<IP  version=4L ihl=5L tos=0x0 len=48 id=1 flags= frag=0L ttl=64 proto=tcp chksum=0x74c2 src=1.1.1.1 dst=2.2.2.2 options=[] |<TCP  sport=45012 dport=http seq=0 ack=0 dataofs=5L reserved=0L flags=S window=8192 chksum=0x1914 urgptr=0 options=[] |<Raw  load='testdata' |>>>  # noqa: E501
>>>
>>> e = sa.encrypt(p)
>>> e
<IP  version=4L ihl=5L tos=0x0 len=76 id=1 flags= frag=0L ttl=64 proto=esp chksum=0x747a src=1.1.1.1 dst=2.2.2.2 |<ESP  spi=0xdeadbeef seq=1 data=b'\xf8\xdb\x1e\x83[T\xab\\\xd2\x1b\xed\xd1\xe5\xc8Y\xc2\xa5d\x92\xc1\x05\x17\xa6\x92\x831\xe6\xc1]\x9a\xd6K}W\x8bFfd\xa5B*+\xde\xc8\x89\xbf{\xa9' |>>  # noqa: E501
>>>
>>> d = sa.decrypt(e)
>>> d
<IP  version=4L ihl=5L tos=0x0 len=48 id=1 flags= frag=0L ttl=64 proto=tcp chksum=0x74c2 src=1.1.1.1 dst=2.2.2.2 |<TCP  sport=45012 dport=http seq=0 ack=0 dataofs=5L reserved=0L flags=S window=8192 chksum=0x1914 urgptr=0 options=[] |<Raw  load='testdata' |>>>  # noqa: E501
>>>
>>> d == p
True
"""

from __future__ import absolute_import
try:
    from math import gcd
except ImportError:
    from fractions import gcd
import os
import socket
import struct

from scapy.config import conf, crypto_validator
from scapy.compat import orb, raw
from scapy.data import IP_PROTOS
from scapy.error import log_loading
from scapy.fields import ByteEnumField, ByteField, IntField, PacketField, \
    ShortField, StrField, XIntField, XStrField, XStrLenField
from scapy.packet import Packet, bind_layers, Raw
from scapy.layers.inet import IP, UDP
import scapy.modules.six as six
from scapy.modules.six.moves import range
from scapy.layers.inet6 import IPv6, IPv6ExtHdrHopByHop, IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt, \
    IPv6ExtHdrRouting


###############################################################################
class AH(Packet):
    """
    Authentication Header

    See https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4302.txt
    """

    name = 'AH'

    def __get_icv_len(self):
        """
        Compute the size of the ICV based on the payloadlen field.
        Padding size is included as it can only be known from the authentication  # noqa: E501
        algorithm provided by the Security Association.
        """
        # payloadlen = length of AH in 32-bit words (4-byte units), minus "2"
        # payloadlen = 3 32-bit word fixed fields + ICV + padding - 2
        # ICV = (payloadlen + 2 - 3 - padding) in 32-bit words
        return (self.payloadlen - 1) * 4

    fields_desc = [
        ByteEnumField('nh', None, IP_PROTOS),
        ByteField('payloadlen', None),
        ShortField('reserved', None),
        XIntField('spi', 0x0),
        IntField('seq', 0),
        XStrLenField('icv', None, length_from=__get_icv_len),
        # Padding len can only be known with the SecurityAssociation.auth_algo
        XStrLenField('padding', None, length_from=lambda x: 0),
    ]

    overload_fields = {
        IP: {'proto': socket.IPPROTO_AH},
        IPv6: {'nh': socket.IPPROTO_AH},
        IPv6ExtHdrHopByHop: {'nh': socket.IPPROTO_AH},
        IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt: {'nh': socket.IPPROTO_AH},
        IPv6ExtHdrRouting: {'nh': socket.IPPROTO_AH},
    }


bind_layers(IP, AH, proto=socket.IPPROTO_AH)
bind_layers(IPv6, AH, nh=socket.IPPROTO_AH)
bind_layers(AH, IP, nh=socket.IPPROTO_IP)
bind_layers(AH, IPv6, nh=socket.IPPROTO_IPV6)

###############################################################################


class ESP(Packet):
    """
    Encapsulated Security Payload

    See https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4303.txt
    """
    name = 'ESP'

    fields_desc = [
        XIntField('spi', 0x0),
        IntField('seq', 0),
        XStrField('data', None),
    ]

    overload_fields = {
        IP: {'proto': socket.IPPROTO_ESP},
        IPv6: {'nh': socket.IPPROTO_ESP},
        IPv6ExtHdrHopByHop: {'nh': socket.IPPROTO_ESP},
        IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt: {'nh': socket.IPPROTO_ESP},
        IPv6ExtHdrRouting: {'nh': socket.IPPROTO_ESP},
    }


bind_layers(IP, ESP, proto=socket.IPPROTO_ESP)
bind_layers(IPv6, ESP, nh=socket.IPPROTO_ESP)
bind_layers(UDP, ESP, dport=4500)  # NAT-Traversal encapsulation
bind_layers(UDP, ESP, sport=4500)  # NAT-Traversal encapsulation

###############################################################################


class _ESPPlain(Packet):
    """
    Internal class to represent unencrypted ESP packets.
    """
    name = 'ESP'

    fields_desc = [
        XIntField('spi', 0x0),
        IntField('seq', 0),

        StrField('iv', ''),
        PacketField('data', '', Raw),
        StrField('padding', ''),

        ByteField('padlen', 0),
        ByteEnumField('nh', 0, IP_PROTOS),
        StrField('icv', ''),
    ]

    def data_for_encryption(self):
        return raw(self.data) + self.padding + struct.pack("BB", self.padlen, self.nh)  # noqa: E501


###############################################################################
if conf.crypto_valid:
    from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidTag
    from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import (
        Cipher,
        algorithms,
        modes,
    )
else:
    log_loading.info("Can't import python-cryptography v1.7+. "
                     "Disabled IPsec encryption/authentication.")
    default_backend = None
    InvalidTag = Exception
    Cipher = algorithms = modes = None

###############################################################################


def _lcm(a, b):
    """
    Least Common Multiple between 2 integers.
    """
    if a == 0 or b == 0:
        return 0
    else:
        return abs(a * b) // gcd(a, b)


class CryptAlgo(object):
    """
    IPsec encryption algorithm
    """

    def __init__(self, name, cipher, mode, block_size=None, iv_size=None,
                 key_size=None, icv_size=None, salt_size=None, format_mode_iv=None):  # noqa: E501
        """
        :param name: the name of this encryption algorithm
        :param cipher: a Cipher module
        :param mode: the mode used with the cipher module
        :param block_size: the length a block for this algo. Defaults to the
                           `block_size` of the cipher.
        :param iv_size: the length of the initialization vector of this algo.
                        Defaults to the `block_size` of the cipher.
        :param key_size: an integer or list/tuple of integers. If specified,
                         force the secret keys length to one of the values.
                         Defaults to the `key_size` of the cipher.
        :param icv_size: the length of the Integrity Check Value of this algo.
                         Used by Combined Mode Algorithms e.g. GCM
        :param salt_size: the length of the salt to use as the IV prefix.
                          Usually used by Counter modes e.g. CTR
        :param format_mode_iv: function to format the Initialization Vector
                               e.g. handle the salt value
                               Default is the random buffer from `generate_iv`
        """
        self.name = name
        self.cipher = cipher
        self.mode = mode
        self.icv_size = icv_size

        if modes and self.mode is not None:
            self.is_aead = issubclass(self.mode,
                                      modes.ModeWithAuthenticationTag)
        else:
            self.is_aead = False

        if block_size is not None:
            self.block_size = block_size
        elif cipher is not None:
            self.block_size = cipher.block_size // 8
        else:
            self.block_size = 1

        if iv_size is None:
            self.iv_size = self.block_size
        else:
            self.iv_size = iv_size

        if key_size is not None:
            self.key_size = key_size
        elif cipher is not None:
            self.key_size = tuple(i // 8 for i in cipher.key_sizes)
        else:
            self.key_size = None

        if salt_size is None:
            self.salt_size = 0
        else:
            self.salt_size = salt_size

        if format_mode_iv is None:
            self._format_mode_iv = lambda iv, **kw: iv
        else:
            self._format_mode_iv = format_mode_iv

    def check_key(self, key):
        """
        Check that the key length is valid.

        :param key:    a byte string
        """
        if self.key_size and not (len(key) == self.key_size or len(key) in self.key_size):  # noqa: E501
            raise TypeError('invalid key size %s, must be %s' %
                            (len(key), self.key_size))

    def generate_iv(self):
        """
        Generate a random initialization vector.
        """
        # XXX: Handle counter modes with real counters? RFCs allow the use of
        # XXX: random bytes for counters, so it is not wrong to do it that way
        return os.urandom(self.iv_size)

    @crypto_validator
    def new_cipher(self, key, mode_iv, digest=None):
        """
        :param key:     the secret key, a byte string
        :param mode_iv: the initialization vector or nonce, a byte string.
                        Formatted by `format_mode_iv`.
        :param digest:  also known as tag or icv. A byte string containing the
                        digest of the encrypted data. Only use this during
                        decryption!

        :returns:    an initialized cipher object for this algo
        """
        if self.is_aead and digest is not None:
            # With AEAD, the mode needs the digest during decryption.
            return Cipher(
                self.cipher(key),
                self.mode(mode_iv, digest, len(digest)),
                default_backend(),
            )
        else:
            return Cipher(
                self.cipher(key),
                self.mode(mode_iv),
                default_backend(),
            )

    def pad(self, esp):
        """
        Add the correct amount of padding so that the data to encrypt is
        exactly a multiple of the algorithm's block size.

        Also, make sure that the total ESP packet length is a multiple of 4
        bytes.

        :param esp:    an unencrypted _ESPPlain packet

        :returns:    an unencrypted _ESPPlain packet with valid padding
        """
        # 2 extra bytes for padlen and nh
        data_len = len(esp.data) + 2

        # according to the RFC4303, section 2.4. Padding (for Encryption)
        # the size of the ESP payload must be a multiple of 32 bits
        align = _lcm(self.block_size, 4)

        # pad for block size
        esp.padlen = -data_len % align

        # Still according to the RFC, the default value for padding *MUST* be an  # noqa: E501
        # array of bytes starting from 1 to padlen
        # TODO: Handle padding function according to the encryption algo
        esp.padding = struct.pack("B" * esp.padlen, *range(1, esp.padlen + 1))

        # If the following test fails, it means that this algo does not comply
        # with the RFC
        payload_len = len(esp.iv) + len(esp.data) + len(esp.padding) + 2
        if payload_len % 4 != 0:
            raise ValueError('The size of the ESP data is not aligned to 32 bits after padding.')  # noqa: E501

        return esp

    def encrypt(self, sa, esp, key, esn_en=False, esn=0):
        """
        Encrypt an ESP packet

        :param sa:   the SecurityAssociation associated with the ESP packet.
        :param esp:  an unencrypted _ESPPlain packet with valid padding
        :param key:  the secret key used for encryption
        :esn_en:     extended sequence number enable which allows to use 64-bit
                     sequence number instead of 32-bit when using an AEAD
                     algorithm
        :esn:        extended sequence number (32 MSB)
        :return:    a valid ESP packet encrypted with this algorithm
        """
        data = esp.data_for_encryption()

        if self.cipher:
            mode_iv = self._format_mode_iv(algo=self, sa=sa, iv=esp.iv)
            cipher = self.new_cipher(key, mode_iv)
            encryptor = cipher.encryptor()

            if self.is_aead:
                if esn_en:
                    aad = struct.pack('!LLL', esp.spi, esn, esp.seq)
                else:
                    aad = struct.pack('!LL', esp.spi, esp.seq)
                encryptor.authenticate_additional_data(aad)
                data = encryptor.update(data) + encryptor.finalize()
                data += encryptor.tag[:self.icv_size]
            else:
                data = encryptor.update(data) + encryptor.finalize()

        return ESP(spi=esp.spi, seq=esp.seq, data=esp.iv + data)

    def decrypt(self, sa, esp, key, icv_size=None, esn_en=False, esn=0):
        """
        Decrypt an ESP packet

        :param sa: the SecurityAssociation associated with the ESP packet.
        :param esp: an encrypted ESP packet
        :param key: the secret key used for encryption
        :param icv_size: the length of the icv used for integrity check
        :param esn_en: extended sequence number enable which allows to use
                       64-bit sequence number instead of 32-bit when using an
                       AEAD algorithm
        :param esn: extended sequence number (32 MSB)
        :returns: a valid ESP packet encrypted with this algorithm
        :raise scapy.layers.ipsec.IPSecIntegrityError: if the integrity check
            fails with an AEAD algorithm
        """
        if icv_size is None:
            icv_size = self.icv_size if self.is_aead else 0

        iv = esp.data[:self.iv_size]
        data = esp.data[self.iv_size:len(esp.data) - icv_size]
        icv = esp.data[len(esp.data) - icv_size:]

        if self.cipher:
            mode_iv = self._format_mode_iv(sa=sa, iv=iv)
            cipher = self.new_cipher(key, mode_iv, icv)
            decryptor = cipher.decryptor()

            if self.is_aead:
                # Tag value check is done during the finalize method
                if esn_en:
                    decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(
                        struct.pack('!LLL', esp.spi, esn, esp.seq))
                else:
                    decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(
                        struct.pack('!LL', esp.spi, esp.seq))
            try:
                data = decryptor.update(data) + decryptor.finalize()
            except InvalidTag as err:
                raise IPSecIntegrityError(err)

        # extract padlen and nh
        padlen = orb(data[-2])
        nh = orb(data[-1])

        # then use padlen to determine data and padding
        data = data[:len(data) - padlen - 2]
        padding = data[len(data) - padlen - 2: len(data) - 2]

        return _ESPPlain(spi=esp.spi,
                         seq=esp.seq,
                         iv=iv,
                         data=data,
                         padding=padding,
                         padlen=padlen,
                         nh=nh,
                         icv=icv)

###############################################################################
# The names of the encryption algorithms are the same than in scapy.contrib.ikev2  # noqa: E501
# see http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/ikev2-parameters.xhtml


CRYPT_ALGOS = {
    'NULL': CryptAlgo('NULL', cipher=None, mode=None, iv_size=0),
}

if algorithms:
    CRYPT_ALGOS['AES-CBC'] = CryptAlgo('AES-CBC',
                                       cipher=algorithms.AES,
                                       mode=modes.CBC)
    _aes_ctr_format_mode_iv = lambda sa, iv, **kw: sa.crypt_salt + iv + b'\x00\x00\x00\x01'  # noqa: E501
    CRYPT_ALGOS['AES-CTR'] = CryptAlgo('AES-CTR',
                                       cipher=algorithms.AES,
                                       mode=modes.CTR,
                                       iv_size=8,
                                       salt_size=4,
                                       format_mode_iv=_aes_ctr_format_mode_iv)
    _salt_format_mode_iv = lambda sa, iv, **kw: sa.crypt_salt + iv
    CRYPT_ALGOS['AES-GCM'] = CryptAlgo('AES-GCM',
                                       cipher=algorithms.AES,
                                       mode=modes.GCM,
                                       salt_size=4,
                                       iv_size=8,
                                       icv_size=16,
                                       format_mode_iv=_salt_format_mode_iv)
    if hasattr(modes, 'CCM'):
        CRYPT_ALGOS['AES-CCM'] = CryptAlgo('AES-CCM',
                                           cipher=algorithms.AES,
                                           mode=modes.CCM,
                                           iv_size=8,
                                           salt_size=3,
                                           icv_size=16,
                                           format_mode_iv=_salt_format_mode_iv)
    # XXX: Flagged as weak by 'cryptography'. Kept for backward compatibility
    CRYPT_ALGOS['Blowfish'] = CryptAlgo('Blowfish',
                                        cipher=algorithms.Blowfish,
                                        mode=modes.CBC)
    # XXX: RFC7321 states that DES *MUST NOT* be implemented.
    # XXX: Keep for backward compatibility?
    # Using a TripleDES cipher algorithm for DES is done by using the same 64
    # bits key 3 times (done by cryptography when given a 64 bits key)
    CRYPT_ALGOS['DES'] = CryptAlgo('DES',
                                   cipher=algorithms.TripleDES,
                                   mode=modes.CBC,
                                   key_size=(8,))
    CRYPT_ALGOS['3DES'] = CryptAlgo('3DES',
                                    cipher=algorithms.TripleDES,
                                    mode=modes.CBC)
    CRYPT_ALGOS['CAST'] = CryptAlgo('CAST',
                                    cipher=algorithms.CAST5,
                                    mode=modes.CBC)

###############################################################################
if conf.crypto_valid:
    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hmac import HMAC
    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.cmac import CMAC
    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
else:
    # no error if cryptography is not available but authentication won't be supported  # noqa: E501
    HMAC = CMAC = hashes = None

###############################################################################


class IPSecIntegrityError(Exception):
    """
    Error risen when the integrity check fails.
    """
    pass


class AuthAlgo(object):
    """
    IPsec integrity algorithm
    """

    def __init__(self, name, mac, digestmod, icv_size, key_size=None):
        """
        :param name: the name of this integrity algorithm
        :param mac: a Message Authentication Code module
        :param digestmod: a Hash or Cipher module
        :param icv_size: the length of the integrity check value of this algo
        :param key_size: an integer or list/tuple of integers. If specified,
                         force the secret keys length to one of the values.
                         Defaults to the `key_size` of the cipher.
        """
        self.name = name
        self.mac = mac
        self.digestmod = digestmod
        self.icv_size = icv_size
        self.key_size = key_size

    def check_key(self, key):
        """
        Check that the key length is valid.

        :param key:    a byte string
        """
        if self.key_size and len(key) not in self.key_size:
            raise TypeError('invalid key size %s, must be one of %s' %
                            (len(key), self.key_size))

    @crypto_validator
    def new_mac(self, key):
        """
        :param key:    a byte string
        :returns:       an initialized mac object for this algo
        """
        if self.mac is CMAC:
            return self.mac(self.digestmod(key), default_backend())
        else:
            return self.mac(key, self.digestmod(), default_backend())

    def sign(self, pkt, key, esn_en=False, esn=0):
        """
        Sign an IPsec (ESP or AH) packet with this algo.

        :param pkt:    a packet that contains a valid encrypted ESP or AH layer
        :param key:    the authentication key, a byte string
        :param esn_en: extended sequence number enable which allows to use
                       64-bit sequence number instead of 32-bit
        :param esn: extended sequence number (32 MSB)

        :returns: the signed packet
        """
        if not self.mac:
            return pkt

        mac = self.new_mac(key)

        if pkt.haslayer(ESP):
            mac.update(raw(pkt[ESP]))
            pkt[ESP].data += mac.finalize()[:self.icv_size]

        elif pkt.haslayer(AH):
            clone = zero_mutable_fields(pkt.copy(), sending=True)
            if esn_en:
                temp = raw(clone) + struct.pack('!L', esn)
            else:
                temp = raw(clone)
            mac.update(temp)
            pkt[AH].icv = mac.finalize()[:self.icv_size]

        return pkt

    def verify(self, pkt, key, esn_en=False, esn=0):
        """
        Check that the integrity check value (icv) of a packet is valid.

        :param pkt:    a packet that contains a valid encrypted ESP or AH layer
        :param key:    the authentication key, a byte string
        :param esn_en: extended sequence number enable which allows to use
                       64-bit sequence number instead of 32-bit
        :param esn: extended sequence number (32 MSB)

        :raise scapy.layers.ipsec.IPSecIntegrityError: if the integrity check
            fails
        """
        if not self.mac or self.icv_size == 0:
            return

        mac = self.new_mac(key)

        pkt_icv = 'not found'

        if isinstance(pkt, ESP):
            pkt_icv = pkt.data[len(pkt.data) - self.icv_size:]
            clone = pkt.copy()
            clone.data = clone.data[:len(clone.data) - self.icv_size]
            temp = raw(clone)

        elif pkt.haslayer(AH):
            if len(pkt[AH].icv) != self.icv_size:
                # Fill padding since we know the actual icv_size
                pkt[AH].padding = pkt[AH].icv[self.icv_size:]
                pkt[AH].icv = pkt[AH].icv[:self.icv_size]
            pkt_icv = pkt[AH].icv
            clone = zero_mutable_fields(pkt.copy(), sending=False)
            if esn_en:
                temp = raw(clone) + struct.pack('!L', esn)
            else:
                temp = raw(clone)

        mac.update(temp)
        computed_icv = mac.finalize()[:self.icv_size]

        # XXX: Cannot use mac.verify because the ICV can be truncated
        if pkt_icv != computed_icv:
            raise IPSecIntegrityError('pkt_icv=%r, computed_icv=%r' %
                                      (pkt_icv, computed_icv))

###############################################################################
# The names of the integrity algorithms are the same than in scapy.contrib.ikev2  # noqa: E501
# see http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/ikev2-parameters.xhtml


AUTH_ALGOS = {
    'NULL': AuthAlgo('NULL', mac=None, digestmod=None, icv_size=0),
}

if HMAC and hashes:
    # XXX: NIST has deprecated SHA1 but is required by RFC7321
    AUTH_ALGOS['HMAC-SHA1-96'] = AuthAlgo('HMAC-SHA1-96',
                                          mac=HMAC,
                                          digestmod=hashes.SHA1,
                                          icv_size=12)
    AUTH_ALGOS['SHA2-256-128'] = AuthAlgo('SHA2-256-128',
                                          mac=HMAC,
                                          digestmod=hashes.SHA256,
                                          icv_size=16)
    AUTH_ALGOS['SHA2-384-192'] = AuthAlgo('SHA2-384-192',
                                          mac=HMAC,
                                          digestmod=hashes.SHA384,
                                          icv_size=24)
    AUTH_ALGOS['SHA2-512-256'] = AuthAlgo('SHA2-512-256',
                                          mac=HMAC,
                                          digestmod=hashes.SHA512,
                                          icv_size=32)
    # XXX:Flagged as deprecated by 'cryptography'. Kept for backward compat
    AUTH_ALGOS['HMAC-MD5-96'] = AuthAlgo('HMAC-MD5-96',
                                         mac=HMAC,
                                         digestmod=hashes.MD5,
                                         icv_size=12)
if CMAC and algorithms:
    AUTH_ALGOS['AES-CMAC-96'] = AuthAlgo('AES-CMAC-96',
                                         mac=CMAC,
                                         digestmod=algorithms.AES,
                                         icv_size=12,
                                         key_size=(16,))

###############################################################################


def split_for_transport(orig_pkt, transport_proto):
    """
    Split an IP(v6) packet in the correct location to insert an ESP or AH
    header.

    :param orig_pkt: the packet to split. Must be an IP or IPv6 packet
    :param transport_proto: the IPsec protocol number that will be inserted
                            at the split position.
    :returns: a tuple (header, nh, payload) where nh is the protocol number of
             payload.
    """
    # force resolution of default fields to avoid padding errors
    header = orig_pkt.__class__(raw(orig_pkt))
    next_hdr = header.payload
    nh = None

    if header.version == 4:
        nh = header.proto
        header.proto = transport_proto
        header.remove_payload()
        del header.chksum
        del header.len

        return header, nh, next_hdr
    else:
        found_rt_hdr = False
        prev = header

        # Since the RFC 4302 is vague about where the ESP/AH headers should be
        # inserted in IPv6, I chose to follow the linux implementation.
        while isinstance(next_hdr, (IPv6ExtHdrHopByHop, IPv6ExtHdrRouting, IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt)):  # noqa: E501
            if isinstance(next_hdr, IPv6ExtHdrHopByHop):
                pass
            if isinstance(next_hdr, IPv6ExtHdrRouting):
                found_rt_hdr = True
            elif isinstance(next_hdr, IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt) and found_rt_hdr:
                break

            prev = next_hdr
            next_hdr = next_hdr.payload

        nh = prev.nh
        prev.nh = transport_proto
        prev.remove_payload()
        del header.plen

        return header, nh, next_hdr


###############################################################################
# see RFC 4302 - Appendix A. Mutability of IP Options/Extension Headers
IMMUTABLE_IPV4_OPTIONS = (
    0,  # End Of List
    1,  # No OPeration
    2,  # Security
    5,  # Extended Security
    6,  # Commercial Security
    20,  # Router Alert
    21,  # Sender Directed Multi-Destination Delivery
)


def zero_mutable_fields(pkt, sending=False):
    """
    When using AH, all "mutable" fields must be "zeroed" before calculating
    the ICV. See RFC 4302, Section 3.3.3.1. Handling Mutable Fields.

    :param pkt: an IP(v6) packet containing an AH layer.
                NOTE: The packet will be modified
    :param sending: if true, ipv6 routing headers will not be reordered
    """

    if pkt.haslayer(AH):
        pkt[AH].icv = b"\x00" * len(pkt[AH].icv)
    else:
        raise TypeError('no AH layer found')

    if pkt.version == 4:
        # the tos field has been replaced by DSCP and ECN
        # Routers may rewrite the DS field as needed to provide a
        # desired local or end-to-end service
        pkt.tos = 0
        # an intermediate router might set the DF bit, even if the source
        # did not select it.
        pkt.flags = 0
        # changed en route as a normal course of processing by routers
        pkt.ttl = 0
        # will change if any of these other fields change
        pkt.chksum = 0

        immutable_opts = []
        for opt in pkt.options:
            if opt.option in IMMUTABLE_IPV4_OPTIONS:
                immutable_opts.append(opt)
            else:
                immutable_opts.append(Raw(b"\x00" * len(opt)))
        pkt.options = immutable_opts

    else:
        # holds DSCP and ECN
        pkt.tc = 0
        # The flow label described in AHv1 was mutable, and in RFC 2460 [DH98]
        # was potentially mutable. To retain compatibility with existing AH
        # implementations, the flow label is not included in the ICV in AHv2.
        pkt.fl = 0
        # same as ttl
        pkt.hlim = 0

        next_hdr = pkt.payload

        while isinstance(next_hdr, (IPv6ExtHdrHopByHop, IPv6ExtHdrRouting, IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt)):  # noqa: E501
            if isinstance(next_hdr, (IPv6ExtHdrHopByHop, IPv6ExtHdrDestOpt)):
                for opt in next_hdr.options:
                    if opt.otype & 0x20:
                        # option data can change en-route and must be zeroed
                        opt.optdata = b"\x00" * opt.optlen
            elif isinstance(next_hdr, IPv6ExtHdrRouting) and sending:
                # The sender must order the field so that it appears as it
                # will at the receiver, prior to performing the ICV computation.  # noqa: E501
                next_hdr.segleft = 0
                if next_hdr.addresses:
                    final = next_hdr.addresses.pop()
                    next_hdr.addresses.insert(0, pkt.dst)
                    pkt.dst = final
            else:
                break

            next_hdr = next_hdr.payload

    return pkt

###############################################################################


class SecurityAssociation(object):
    """
    This class is responsible of "encryption" and "decryption" of IPsec packets.  # noqa: E501
    """

    SUPPORTED_PROTOS = (IP, IPv6)

    def __init__(self, proto, spi, seq_num=1, crypt_algo=None, crypt_key=None,
                 auth_algo=None, auth_key=None, tunnel_header=None, nat_t_header=None, esn_en=False, esn=0):   # noqa: E501
        """
        :param proto: the IPsec proto to use (ESP or AH)
        :param spi: the Security Parameters Index of this SA
        :param seq_num: the initial value for the sequence number on encrypted
                        packets
        :param crypt_algo: the encryption algorithm name (only used with ESP)
        :param crypt_key: the encryption key (only used with ESP)
        :param auth_algo: the integrity algorithm name
        :param auth_key: the integrity key
        :param tunnel_header: an instance of a IP(v6) header that will be used
                              to encapsulate the encrypted packets.
        :param nat_t_header: an instance of a UDP header that will be used
                             for NAT-Traversal.
        :param esn_en: extended sequence number enable which allows to use
                       64-bit sequence number instead of 32-bit when using an
                       AEAD algorithm
        :param esn: extended sequence number (32 MSB)
        """

        if proto not in (ESP, AH, ESP.name, AH.name):
            raise ValueError("proto must be either ESP or AH")
        if isinstance(proto, six.string_types):
            self.proto = eval(proto)
        else:
            self.proto = proto

        self.spi = spi
        self.seq_num = seq_num
        self.esn_en = esn_en
        # Get Extended Sequence (32 MSB)
        self.esn = esn
        if crypt_algo:
            if crypt_algo not in CRYPT_ALGOS:
                raise TypeError('unsupported encryption algo %r, try %r' %
                                (crypt_algo, list(CRYPT_ALGOS)))
            self.crypt_algo = CRYPT_ALGOS[crypt_algo]

            if crypt_key:
                salt_size = self.crypt_algo.salt_size
                self.crypt_key = crypt_key[:len(crypt_key) - salt_size]
                self.crypt_salt = crypt_key[len(crypt_key) - salt_size:]
            else:
                self.crypt_key = None
                self.crypt_salt = None

        else:
            self.crypt_algo = CRYPT_ALGOS['NULL']
            self.crypt_key = None
            self.crypt_salt = None

        if auth_algo:
            if auth_algo not in AUTH_ALGOS:
                raise TypeError('unsupported integrity algo %r, try %r' %
                                (auth_algo, list(AUTH_ALGOS)))
            self.auth_algo = AUTH_ALGOS[auth_algo]
            self.auth_key = auth_key
        else:
            self.auth_algo = AUTH_ALGOS['NULL']
            self.auth_key = None

        if tunnel_header and not isinstance(tunnel_header, (IP, IPv6)):
            raise TypeError('tunnel_header must be %s or %s' % (IP.name, IPv6.name))  # noqa: E501
        self.tunnel_header = tunnel_header

        if nat_t_header:
            if proto is not ESP:
                raise TypeError('nat_t_header is only allowed with ESP')
            if not isinstance(nat_t_header, UDP):
                raise TypeError('nat_t_header must be %s' % UDP.name)
        self.nat_t_header = nat_t_header

    def check_spi(self, pkt):
        if pkt.spi != self.spi:
            raise TypeError('packet spi=0x%x does not match the SA spi=0x%x' %
                            (pkt.spi, self.spi))

    def _encrypt_esp(self, pkt, seq_num=None, iv=None, esn_en=None, esn=None):

        if iv is None:
            iv = self.crypt_algo.generate_iv()
        else:
            if len(iv) != self.crypt_algo.iv_size:
                raise TypeError('iv length must be %s' % self.crypt_algo.iv_size)  # noqa: E501

        esp = _ESPPlain(spi=self.spi, seq=seq_num or self.seq_num, iv=iv)

        if self.tunnel_header:
            tunnel = self.tunnel_header.copy()

            if tunnel.version == 4:
                del tunnel.proto
                del tunnel.len
                del tunnel.chksum
            else:
                del tunnel.nh
                del tunnel.plen

            pkt = tunnel.__class__(raw(tunnel / pkt))

        ip_header, nh, payload = split_for_transport(pkt, socket.IPPROTO_ESP)
        esp.data = payload
        esp.nh = nh

        esp = self.crypt_algo.pad(esp)
        esp = self.crypt_algo.encrypt(self, esp, self.crypt_key,
                                      esn_en=esn_en or self.esn_en,
                                      esn=esn or self.esn)

        self.auth_algo.sign(esp, self.auth_key)

        if self.nat_t_header:
            nat_t_header = self.nat_t_header.copy()
            nat_t_header.chksum = 0
            del nat_t_header.len
            if ip_header.version == 4:
                del ip_header.proto
            else:
                del ip_header.nh
            ip_header /= nat_t_header

        if ip_header.version == 4:
            ip_header.len = len(ip_header) + len(esp)
            del ip_header.chksum
            ip_header = ip_header.__class__(raw(ip_header))
        else:
            ip_header.plen = len(ip_header.payload) + len(esp)

        # sequence number must always change, unless specified by the user
        if seq_num is None:
            self.seq_num += 1

        return ip_header / esp

    def _encrypt_ah(self, pkt, seq_num=None, esn_en=False, esn=0):

        ah = AH(spi=self.spi, seq=seq_num or self.seq_num,
                icv=b"\x00" * self.auth_algo.icv_size)

        if self.tunnel_header:
            tunnel = self.tunnel_header.copy()

            if tunnel.version == 4:
                del tunnel.proto
                del tunnel.len
                del tunnel.chksum
            else:
                del tunnel.nh
                del tunnel.plen

            pkt = tunnel.__class__(raw(tunnel / pkt))

        ip_header, nh, payload = split_for_transport(pkt, socket.IPPROTO_AH)
        ah.nh = nh

        if ip_header.version == 6 and len(ah) % 8 != 0:
            # For IPv6, the total length of the header must be a multiple of
            # 8-octet units.
            ah.padding = b"\x00" * (-len(ah) % 8)
        elif len(ah) % 4 != 0:
            # For IPv4, the total length of the header must be a multiple of
            # 4-octet units.
            ah.padding = b"\x00" * (-len(ah) % 4)

        # RFC 4302 - Section 2.2. Payload Length
        # This 8-bit field specifies the length of AH in 32-bit words (4-byte
        # units), minus "2".
        ah.payloadlen = len(ah) // 4 - 2

        if ip_header.version == 4:
            ip_header.len = len(ip_header) + len(ah) + len(payload)
            del ip_header.chksum
            ip_header = ip_header.__class__(raw(ip_header))
        else:
            ip_header.plen = len(ip_header.payload) + len(ah) + len(payload)

        signed_pkt = self.auth_algo.sign(ip_header / ah / payload,
                                         self.auth_key,
                                         esn_en=esn_en or self.esn_en,
                                         esn=esn or self.esn)

        # sequence number must always change, unless specified by the user
        if seq_num is None:
            self.seq_num += 1

        return signed_pkt

    def encrypt(self, pkt, seq_num=None, iv=None, esn_en=None, esn=None):
        """
        Encrypt (and encapsulate) an IP(v6) packet with ESP or AH according
        to this SecurityAssociation.

        :param pkt:     the packet to encrypt
        :param seq_num: if specified, use this sequence number instead of the
                        generated one
        :param esn_en:  extended sequence number enable which allows to
                        use 64-bit sequence number instead of 32-bit when
                        using an AEAD algorithm
        :param esn:     extended sequence number (32 MSB)
        :param iv:      if specified, use this initialization vector for
                        encryption instead of a random one.

        :returns: the encrypted/encapsulated packet
        """
        if not isinstance(pkt, self.SUPPORTED_PROTOS):
            raise TypeError('cannot encrypt %s, supported protos are %s'
                            % (pkt.__class__, self.SUPPORTED_PROTOS))
        if self.proto is ESP:
            return self._encrypt_esp(pkt, seq_num=seq_num,
                                     iv=iv, esn_en=esn_en,
                                     esn=esn)
        else:
            return self._encrypt_ah(pkt, seq_num=seq_num,
                                    esn_en=esn_en, esn=esn)

    def _decrypt_esp(self, pkt, verify=True, esn_en=None, esn=None):

        encrypted = pkt[ESP]

        if verify:
            self.check_spi(pkt)
            self.auth_algo.verify(encrypted, self.auth_key)

        esp = self.crypt_algo.decrypt(self, encrypted, self.crypt_key,
                                      self.crypt_algo.icv_size or
                                      self.auth_algo.icv_size,
                                      esn_en=esn_en or self.esn_en,
                                      esn=esn or self.esn)

        if self.tunnel_header:
            # drop the tunnel header and return the payload untouched

            pkt.remove_payload()
            if pkt.version == 4:
                pkt.proto = esp.nh
            else:
                pkt.nh = esp.nh
            cls = pkt.guess_payload_class(esp.data)

            return cls(esp.data)
        else:
            ip_header = pkt

            if ip_header.version == 4:
                ip_header.proto = esp.nh
                del ip_header.chksum
                ip_header.remove_payload()
                ip_header.len = len(ip_header) + len(esp.data)
                # recompute checksum
                ip_header = ip_header.__class__(raw(ip_header))
            else:
                encrypted.underlayer.nh = esp.nh
                encrypted.underlayer.remove_payload()
                ip_header.plen = len(ip_header.payload) + len(esp.data)

            cls = ip_header.guess_payload_class(esp.data)

            # reassemble the ip_header with the ESP payload
            return ip_header / cls(esp.data)

    def _decrypt_ah(self, pkt, verify=True, esn_en=None, esn=None):

        if verify:
            self.check_spi(pkt)
            self.auth_algo.verify(pkt, self.auth_key,
                                  esn_en=esn_en or self.esn_en,
                                  esn=esn or self.esn)

        ah = pkt[AH]
        payload = ah.payload
        payload.remove_underlayer(None)  # useless argument...

        if self.tunnel_header:
            return payload
        else:
            ip_header = pkt

            if ip_header.version == 4:
                ip_header.proto = ah.nh
                del ip_header.chksum
                ip_header.remove_payload()
                ip_header.len = len(ip_header) + len(payload)
                # recompute checksum
                ip_header = ip_header.__class__(raw(ip_header))
            else:
                ah.underlayer.nh = ah.nh
                ah.underlayer.remove_payload()
                ip_header.plen = len(ip_header.payload) + len(payload)

            # reassemble the ip_header with the AH payload
            return ip_header / payload

    def decrypt(self, pkt, verify=True, esn_en=None, esn=None):
        """
        Decrypt (and decapsulate) an IP(v6) packet containing ESP or AH.

        :param pkt:     the packet to decrypt
        :param verify:  if False, do not perform the integrity check
        :param esn_en:  extended sequence number enable which allows to use
                        64-bit sequence number instead of 32-bit when using an
                        AEAD algorithm
        :param esn:        extended sequence number (32 MSB)
        :returns: the decrypted/decapsulated packet
        :raise scapy.layers.ipsec.IPSecIntegrityError: if the integrity check
            fails
        """
        if not isinstance(pkt, self.SUPPORTED_PROTOS):
            raise TypeError('cannot decrypt %s, supported protos are %s'
                            % (pkt.__class__, self.SUPPORTED_PROTOS))

        if self.proto is ESP and pkt.haslayer(ESP):
            return self._decrypt_esp(pkt, verify=verify,
                                     esn_en=esn_en, esn=esn)
        elif self.proto is AH and pkt.haslayer(AH):
            return self._decrypt_ah(pkt, verify=verify, esn_en=esn_en, esn=esn)
        else:
            raise TypeError('%s has no %s layer' % (pkt, self.proto.name))